Research Statement

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My primary field is applied microeconomics, with a focus on the intersection of public economics and industrial organization. My research investigates how institutional design, market rules, and political constraints shape economic agents behavior and the effectiveness of public spending. I explore these themes through three interconnected lines of research: firm dynamics and market structure, public finance and political economy, and policy evaluation.

In my primary strand of research, I examine firm dynamics and market structure, with a particular focus on public procurement. In my job market paper, *Competition, Entry, and Firm Dynamics in Public Procurement*, I study how firms' decisions to bid shape competition for government contracts. I show that entry not only determines which firms compete for a given contract, but also connects the design of procurement procedures directly to the composition of the bidder pool. Furthermore, the paper discusses how the mechanism of contract awards (e.g. open competitiion) actively shape the set of firms available to compete for future contracts.

This work motivates my broader research agenda on the evolution of market structure. I am interested in how firms grow and acquire dominant positions, how market concentration affects innovation and pricing, and how antitrust enforcement and regulation reshape competition. These questions aim to extend my job market research by asking how firms' responses to market rules influence the structure and performance of markets.

A closely related second strand of my work explores the political economy of public finance, specifically focusing on the individuals and institutions that implement state interventions. In *Quality of Public Projects and Procurement Officers Value Added*, my coauthors and I study variation in project quality across individual procurement officers, highlighting the vital role that bureaucratic personnel play in the execution of public spending. Building on this theme of bureaucratic design, *Discretion and Political Favoritism: Evidence from Two Reforms in Public Procurement* leverages two distinct procurement reforms to examine how granting discretion to public officials relates to political favoritism. Broadly, this research informs my ongoing interest in how administrative capacity and institutional design govern the success of state interventions, including subsidies, tax credits, and support for strategic sectors.

My third line of research expands my focus on state intervention to consumer welfare and policy evaluation. In previous work, I have conducted impact evaluations of Colombia's *Familias en Acción* conditional cash transfer program, studying household responses to income transfers. Similarly, a related project examines consumers' welfare analysis in the context of market interventions. Insights from income transfers and market behavior together inform the assessment of policy impacts on welfare. These projects illustrate how micro-level responses inform broader assessments of policy welfare effects.

Looking forward, my research agenda will continue to bridge public policy and industrial organization through the lens of market design. Public procurement offers a rich, underexplored setting in which governments simultaneously act as regulators, buyers, and market designers. I plan to study economic agents' behavior and the effectiveness of public spending.